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Abstract  
Sociologists and demographers have long been interested in the role of economic uncertainty 
in family behavior. Despite the prevailing “bourgeois conviction” that economic uncertainty 
discourages people from having children, the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. In this 
paper, I summarize the recent empirical evidence, and discuss the potential limitations of 
previous investigations. Among the possible shortcomings of these studies is that many relied 
exclusively on unemployment as an operational definition of labor market uncertainty. 
Subjective indicators of economic uncertainty, which measure the individual’s perception of 
his or her economic situation more directly, often were not available to researchers. Moreover, 
few of these studies explored group-specific differences in behavior. In this paper, we seek to 
overcome some of the limitations of these earlier analyses. Based on data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we study the role of perceived economic uncertainty in 
transitions to first and higher order births for the period 1990-2013. In addition, we examine 
how different population subgroups (stratified by education, parity, and age) respond to 
economic uncertainty.  
Keywords: Fertility, family, unemployment, economic uncertainty 
  
Ökonomische Unsicherheit und Fertilität 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Zusammenhang von ökonomischer Unsicherheit und Geburtenentwicklung ist ein 
Themenfeld, das gleichermaßen von soziologischer wie auch von demographischer Bedeutung 
ist.  Obwohl theoretische Überlegungen zumeist der „bürgerlichen Überzeugung“ verhaftet 
geblieben sind, dass ökonomische Unsicherheiten sich negativ auf das Geburtenverhalten 
niederschlagen sollten, haben empirische Studien in diesem Bereich eher uneinheitliche 
Befunde geliefert. Dieser Beitrag fasst aktuelle Studien zusammen und setzt sich kritisch mit 
den vorliegenden empirischen Befunden auseinander. Zum einen haben bisherige Studien 
zumeist nur Arbeitslosigkeit als Merkmal ökonomischer Sicherheit herangezogen. Subjektive 
Indikatoren, die unmittelbarer die aktuelle ökonomische Situation wiederspiegeln, waren in den 
bisher verwendeten Daten oft nicht verfügbar. Darüber hinaus haben nur wenige Studien sich 
der Frage gewidmet, ob unterschiedliche Subpopulation unterschiedlich auf ökonomische 
Unsicherheit reagieren. Mit diesem Beitrag soll ein Teil dieser Forschungslücke geschlossen 
werden, indem auf Basis der Daten des Sozio-Oekonomischen Panels (SOEP) der Jahre 1990-
2013 der Einfluss der wahrgenommenen ökonomischen Unsicherheit auf die 
Geburtenentwicklung untersucht wird. Darüber hinaus wird die Frage in den Mittelpunkt 
gerückt, ob gruppenspezifische Unterschiede im Verhalten existieren und verschiedene 
Bevölkerungsgruppen (differenziert nach Bildung, Parität und Alter) anders auf ökonomische 
Unsicherheiten reagieren.  
Schlüsselbegriffe: Arbeitslosigkeit, Fertilität, Familie, Ökonomische Unsicherheit 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Since the onset of the global financial crisis, scholars and policy-makers in Europe have become 
increasingly interested in examining the effects of economic uncertainty on family life and 
fertility behavior (Luci and Thévenon 2009; Promberger 2014; Richardson 2010; Sobotka et al. 
2011; Testa and Basten 2014). However, empirical evidence on how the economic crisis has 
affected demographic behavior is still very limited. Most of our empirical knowledge of the 
effects of economic uncertainty on birth dynamics dates from the pre-crisis era. In these studies, 
unemployment (Adsera 2011; Del Bono et al. 2014; Gutiérrez-Domènech 2008; Huttunen and 
Kellokumpu 2012; Kravdal 2002; Kreyenfeld and Andersson 2014; Kreyenfeld 2010; Matysiak 
and Vignoli 2008; Neels et al. 2013; Özcan et al. 2010; Pailhé and Solaz 2012; Schmitt 2012a), 
as well as term-limited working contracts (De La Rica and Iza 2005; Gebel and Giesecke 2009; 
Vignoli et al. 2012) have been explored as potential influences on fertility postponement and 
transitions to higher order births. However, these studies have so far failed to produce 
conclusive evidence of an association between economic uncertainty and fertility. There are a 
number of possible reasons for the inconsistencies in the empirical literature. They may stem 
from the fact that group-specific differences in behavior were not sufficiently accounted for in 
many of the earlier studies. It may also be the case that the association between economic 
uncertainty and fertility is a recent phenomenon. In earlier decades, other factors, particularly 
ideational changes, were cited as the dominant reasons for first birth postponement and 
declining transition rates to higher order births. In the 21st century, however, economic 
uncertainty has become omnipresent, and may have emerged as a driving force of birth 
dynamics. 
In this paper, we seek to contribute in several ways to the growing body of empirical literature 
on the association between economic uncertainty and fertility. First, we provide recent 
empirical evidence of the association between economic uncertainty and birth transitions which 
includes periods both before and after the economic crisis. Second, we go beyond previous 
studies by including subjective measures of economic uncertainty in our investigation. Third, 
we explore group-specific differences in behavior. The paper builds on our own work, in which 
we investigated the effects of uncertainty on the employment careers of women and first birth 
hazards (Kreyenfeld 2010). While this earlier work was restricted to first-order births and to 
female respondents, the current paper provides results for all birth parities, and also draws upon 
information about the male partner’s characteristics. The data come from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is the longest running panel in Europe (Wagner et al. 
2007). Among the positive features of this data set are that it has reasonably large sample sizes 
and provides complete birth histories. Moreover, it asks respondents the same set of questions 
every year, including questions about each individual’s perceptions of his or her personal 
economic situation. For this analysis, we restrict the investigations to the period 1990-2013. 
We employ event history modeling, whereby the dependent variable is the birth intensity in a 
given month. The key independent variable is a measure of the respondent’s perceptions of his 
or her personal economic situation. The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we provide 
a summary of the previous empirical studies which led us to become interested in group-specific 
differences in behavior, in Section 3 we present data and descriptive statistics on birth behavior 
in Germany, in Section 4 we discuss the results from the multivariate results, and in Section 5 
we conclude. 
 
2 Theoretical considerations 
2.1 A historical perspective  
There is a widespread belief among scholars engaged in family research that adverse economic 
conditions lead couples to postpone family formation, and discourage them from having a larger 
family (e.g., Rindfuss et al. 1988). In demographic research, Malthus is usually given credit for 
being the first to have developed a conceptual basis for this assumption. While Malthus was not 
convinced that human beings have the capacity to control their reproductive behavior, the moral 
conviction that people should control their fertility under harsh economic conditions infused 
his work (Mombert 1907, p. 86). For much of northwest European history, this belief was 
reflected in societal norms and legal regulations which governed reproductive behavior 
(Friedlander 1992, p. 28). Until the beginning of last century, couples wishing to marry had to 
seek permission from the authorities, and their application for a marriage license could be 
refused if they were unable to demonstrate that they had a secure economic situation. At that 
time, economic security meant that the male breadwinner had the means to support a family 
without having to rely on public assistance. In southern Germany in particular, these  
regulations represented barriers to marriage for many couples, and were in place until the late 
19th century (Matz 1980, p. 29-36). While these marriage restrictions (Ehebeschränkungen) 
were gradually abolished over time, the bourgeois conviction that couples needed a stable 
economic situation before forming a family persisted.  
The belief that economic security was a prerequisite for family formation formed the basis of 
many theoretical concepts that followed. Unlike Malthus, however, later demographers had to 
grapple with the fact that, by the early 20th century, growing wealth and prosperity were 
negatively related to marriage and birth rates (Brentano 1910; Mombert 1907). Although social 
class, wealth, and income were not well defined concepts at that time, these works nevertheless 
contain important insights into the factors which likely contributed to the relationship between 
economic conditions and birth behavior. Brentano (1910, p. 375) observed that “social 
requirements” increased in tandem with rising social standing, and that families found it 
difficult to meet these requirements if they had a large number of children. Mackenroth (1953) 
later coined the term “Aufstiegswille” to explain why birth rates declined in the process of 
modernization. In his view, modernization had eroded class barriers and opened up the 
opportunity for large shares of the population to climb up the social ladder. Resources which 
were previously invested in raising children were redirected into achieving social upward 
mobility. Brentano (1910: 376) also cited the “altered position of woman” (ibid.: 376) and the 
“movement of emancipation” (ibid: 386) as additional reasons for the plunge in the birth rates. 
Even at that time, the “large increase in the proportion of women earning their own livelihood” 
(ibid.: 379) was regarded as one of the reasons for the decline in birth and marriage rates.  
The ideas outlined above have figured prominently in discussions of fertility ever since, and 
have been formalized in economic fertility models. Thus, it is generally assumed that birth rates 
have declined in large part because the opportunity costs of having children have increased as 
the wages and labor market opportunities of women have risen (Borg 1989; Schultz 1976; 
Willis 1987). While economists have narrowly focused on women’s improved income 
opportunities, the second demographic transition theory (SDT)—which is, undoubtedly, the 
most important demographic concept regarding fertility dynamics developed during the second 
half of the 20th century—challenged the assumption that long-term fertility trends are 
attributable to economic factors. Based on sociological concepts of individualization and value 
change, the scholars who developed the SDT attributed the drop in fertility rates to a profound 
shift in ideas and attitudes, including women’s emancipation and self-actualization (Lesthaeghe 
2010; Van De Kaa 1987). Although the economic theories and the SDT approach were based 
on entirely different premises, they reached a very similar conclusion: namely, the fact that a 
growing share of women were working and achieving economic independence was the main 
reason why fertility had declined so dramatically in Europe.  
The strand of literature that followed addressed the efforts of governments to accommodate the 
needs of working mothers. However, the assumption of many economic fertility models and of 
the SDT approach that work and family life were incompatible no longer seemed to be valid. 
Since the 1990s, variations in cohort fertility rates have been shown to be correlated with social 
policies designed to alleviate the incompatibility of work and family life. In particular, the high 
fertility rates of France and the Nordic countries were cited as evidence that integrating women 
into the labor market can help countries achieve replacement-level birth rates. Meanwhile, the 
low fertility observed in the German-speaking countries was attributed to the traditional family 
policies which were dominant in these countries (Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003; Esping-
Andersen 1999; McDonald 2000; Neyer 2003). Micro-level studies grappled with the question 
of how the policy context can be integrated into fertility models in a convincing manner (Neyer 
and Andersson 2008). However, it became clear that the social policy context had become an 
essential variable which can be seen as mediating the relationship between economic and social 
conditions and birth behavior (Ellingsæter and Pedersen 2015; Kreyenfeld et al. 2012).  
In addition to looking at social policy regulations, demographers have increasingly been 
investigating the question of whether economic uncertainty plays a significant role in variations 
in fertility rates across countries and within societies (Adsera 2011; Mills and Blossfeld 2003). 
This issue was initially raised in research on eastern Europe, where birth rates collapsed after 
the demise of the communist systems and the emergence of labor market uncertainty 
(Billingsley 2011; Sobotka et al. 2011). Since the global financial crisis hit all of Europe starting 
in 2007, economic uncertainty has often been cited in explanations of birth dynamics in 
contemporary societies.  
 
2.2 Economic uncertainty and fertility: Recent evidence 
Investigations based on aggregate-level fertility rates appear to support the idea that economic 
uncertainty is related to variation in national fertility rates (Goldstein et al. 2013; Lanzieri 2013; 
Sobotka et al. 2011). Many southern and eastern European countries, including crisis-ridden 
Greece, experienced declines in their birth rates in the aftermath of the downturn (Vlachadis et 
al. 2014). However, no clear relationship between changes in national unemployment rates and 
fertility has been observed in the rest of Europe. Most puzzling are the trends in the Nordic 
countries, which have seen radical declines in their period fertility rates since 2010. In 
Denmark, for example, the total fertility rate dropped from 1.9 in 2010 to 1.7 in 2013; and for 
no apparent reason (Statistics Denmark 2014). This decline was no less radical than the decrease 
in fertility rates seen in Greece after its economy collapsed. In light of these developments, it is 
difficult to evaluate the magnitude of the decline in birth rates in southern Europe, especially 
as period fertility rates are complex summary measures which can be distorted by tempo effects. 
Moreover, like all macro-level correlations, these investigations are subject to ecological 
fallacies. 
Unfortunately, micro-level evidence on the association between economic uncertainty and 
fertility in the 21st century is still sparse. There is evidence from the 2011 Eurobarometer survey 
which suggests that a household’s financial situation is not related to the fertility intentions of 
its members. However, an individual’s degree of certainty about whether his or her fertility 
intentions will be realized seems to be connected to changes in the financial situation of his or 
her household during the crisis (Testa and Basten 2014). Despite these findings, micro-level 
data on the effects of labor market uncertainty on real birth behavior, and on how this 
association has developed in recent years, remain limited.  
Most of our knowledge about the effects of economic uncertainty on fertility dynamics dates 
from the time before the onset of the financial crisis. These studies used current unemployment 
(Özcan et al. 2010; Pailhé and Solaz 2012; Schmitt 2012a) and fixed-term working contracts 
(De La Rica and Iza 2005; Gebel und Giesecke 2009; Vignoli et al. 2012) as operational 
definitions of economic uncertainty. The type of occupation and the sector of employment were 
also used to capture employment security, based on the assumption that employment in 
particular occupations or in the public sector provides a greater degree of labor market security 
than self-employment or employment in private enterprises (Maul 2012). Most studies have 
found that male unemployment is associated with lower first birth transition rates (Neels et al 
2013; Pailhé and Solaz 2012; Schmitt 2012a). However, the effect of female unemployment on 
first birth rates was shown to be weak in some studies (Kravdal 2002), and non-existent in 
others (Gutiérrez-Domènech 2008; Özcan et al. 2010; Vignoli et al. 2012). For Germany, the 
empirical evidence suggests that employed women have even lower birth rates than women 
who are unemployed or do not work for other reasons (Kreyenfeld 2010; Özcan et al. 2010; 
Schmitt 2012b; Schröder 2010).  
Some of the inconsistencies in these findings may be attributable to the fact that the sample 
sizes used in many of these studies were too small to produce robust and significant results. 
After all, unemployment episodes are rare events in the life courses of women and men. Since 
the event of interest—i.e., birth—is also rare, researchers examining the unemployed 
population have often had to deal with very small numbers of events. The small sample sizes 
also did not allow researchers to conduct more subtle investigations which might have explored 
group-specific differences. In addition, scholars have expressed concerns that the unemployed 
population differ from the employed population in many respects (Del Bono et al. 2014; 
Huttunen and Kellokumpu 2015). Thus, the issue of unobserved population heterogeneity was 
not resolved in these studies (see also Schröder 2010 for a detailed discussion). Finally, current 
unemployment may not be a suitable measure for capturing economic uncertainty, as it merely 
reflects an individual’s current labor market situation, and not his or her actual labor market 
options and career prospects. Subjective measures of economic uncertainty may therefore be a 
better indicator of the economic situation of an individual or a couple than the respondent’s 
current activity status.  
In this paper, we contribute to the empirical literature on the association between economic 
uncertainty and birth dynamics. We expand on our own prior analysis based on the German 
Socio-Economic Panel, in which we investigated the role of perceived economic uncertainty in 
first birth rates (Kreyenfeld 2010). The major finding of this study was that the association 
between the perception of economic uncertainty and the transition to a first birth was weak. 
However, the results also showed that there were differences based on educational level, as less 
educated women experienced elevated birth rates when they were subject to economic 
uncertainty. This earlier study was limited to the period 1984-2006, and thus to the pre-crisis 
era. It also covered a period prior to the launch by the German government of a major family 
policy reform designed to support maternal employment. Furthermore, it only looked at 
uncertainty in the employment careers of women, and at first birth rates. In the current study, 
we expand on this earlier analysis by including higher order births, and by taking into account 
the male partner’s perceptions of his personal economic situation. 
  
3 Data and methods 
The data for this investigation come from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP). 
The GSOEP is one of the largest and longest running panel studies conducted in Europe 
(Wagner et al. 2007). Since the study was first launched in 1984, the respondents have been 
surveyed on an annual basis. In addition to having a reasonably large sample size, the GSOEP 
has a number of positive features, including the fact that it collects complete fertility histories. 
Each respondent’s birth history is surveyed at the first interview, and is updated every year. 
Moreover, the GSOEP provides detailed employment histories, including information on each 
respondent’s perceptions of his or her economic situation. Because it is a household panel, this 
information is available for all of the adult individuals who live in a given household unit. We 
can therefore include in our analysis the male partner’s perceptions of his economic situation, 
and explore the interaction effects between the male and the female partners’ attitudes.  
The total sample of the 2013 GSOEP consisted of 87,095 respondents (including children). 
However, our study population is much smaller. First, we excluded from our study population 
respondents from the high income sample (sample G) as well as the recent immigrant sample 
(sample M). We furthermore restricted our analysis to female respondents who were between 
the ages of 17 and 47. We also limited the analysis to the years 1990-2013, and thus to the 
period of united Germany. We also restricted the sample to respondents who had participated 
in at least two consecutive survey years during that time. Cases with invalid information on key 
variables (such as year of birth, year of birth of children, migration background, or gender) were 
also omitted. If respondents dropped out of the sample, they were censored. However, 
respondents were allowed to reenter the study population. Thus, the data set has some minor 
gaps. Our final sample consists of 7,232 women at risk of having first birth, 4,407 women at 
risk of having a second birth, and 7,561 women at risk of having a third birth. The total number 
of first births was 1,842, the total number of second births was 1,507, and the total number of 
third births was 533 (for the occurrence and exposure tables, see Table A1 in the appendix).  
The key independent variable of interest is the respondent’s perception of his or her personal 
economic situation.1 This is a categorical variable which distinguishes between respondents 
who reported that they were not worried, that they were a bit worried, or that they were very 
worried about their personal economic situation. Employment status is captured by a variable 
which distinguishes between respondents who were participating in education, were 
unemployed, were in part-time employment, were in full-time employment, and were not in the 
                                                          
1  Economic worries are operationalized by the following question: “Wie ist es mit den folgenden Gebieten 
– machen Sie sich da Sorgen? Um ihre eigene wirtschaftliche Situation“ Response categories are: „Große 
Sorgen“, „einige Sorgen“, „keine Sorgen.“  In an earlier study, I also employed the fear of losing one’s 
job as a measure of subjective economic uncertainty (Kreyenfeld 2010). Since this paper already includes 
an array of models, I decided to restrict the analysis to personal economic worries. An advantage of this 
variable is that it applies to all respondents, whereas the fear of losing one’s job is only relevant for the 
employed population. 
labor force (i.e., were not participating in the labor market but were not unemployed). It should 
be noted that the respondents’ employment status was based on self-assessment. We cannot rule 
out the possibility that individuals who, based on official definitions, might have been classified 
as being out of the labor force because they were not seeking employment classified themselves 
as unemployed. In addition, the classification of being in part- or full-time employment was 
based on the self-assessment of the respondent, and does not necessarily follow the international 
guidelines on the definition of full-time employment; i.e., working 30 or more hours per week. 
Educational attainment is captured by a categorical variable which distinguishes between 
respondents who had not earned a university degree or a vocational training certificate (low), 
had received a vocational training certificate (middle), and had earned a college or a university 
degree (high). For the first birth analyses, age is the baseline intensity; while for higher order 
births, it is the duration since last birth. Age at first birth (categorized) is a control variable in 
the second and the third birth models. Another covariate is region, in which we distinguish 
between respondents who were living in eastern Germany and western Germany. We further 
distinguish between natives and migrants. Here we define a migrant as being a person who is a 
foreign citizen, or who was born outside of Germany. This is a rather wide definition of migrant 
status, but it is compatible with the definition commonly applied by the German Federal 
Statistical Office. We also control for partnership status, distinguishing between respondents 
who reported living with a partner, and those who did not have a co-residential partner. For co-
residential episodes, we also make use of information on the (male) partner’s perception of his 
economic situation.2  
The data set is organized as a person-year data set. Many studies have used this panel 
information and employed discrete time hazard models for fertility research. In these models, 
the covariates in a given year were used to predict the probability of having a child in the 
subsequent year. Although this strategy is very straightforward, we did not follow it in this 
paper. Our main reason for using a different procedure is that the interviews in the GSOEP are 
conducted throughout the year. They peak in the beginning of the year, but several interviews 
are nevertheless conducted toward the end of the year. This creates a problem for any analysis 
which tries to use information in year t to predict the birth probability in year t+1, as it cannot 
be ruled out that the respondent was already pregnant when the interview was conducted.  
To ensure that we were measuring all of the covariates before pregnancy, we proceeded as 
follows. In a first step, we compiled the panel information in a person-year data set. Included 
in this data set was information on the exact month that an interview was conducted. We then 
generated an event history data set with monthly spell data. Obviously, we were only able to 
measure the characteristics of a respondent once per survey year; thus, this information is only 
available at different single points in time. To create an event history data set with monthly 
spells, we needed to make assumptions about how the characteristics measured at one point in 
time evolved between the panel waves. We therefore let the characteristics measured in a given 
                                                          
2  The analysis that focuses on the partner’s characteristics is restricted to respondents with male partners. 
Thus, same-sex unions are omitted from that part of the investigation. 
year be constant until the next interview date.3 The date of childbirth (and censoring) was then 
backdated by nine months. Although we are actually modeling pregnancy intensities, we 
employ the terms “birth hazard” and “birth rates” to improve the flow of the paper.  
In the following, we first display descriptive statistics to give an overall impression of the birth 
dynamics in Germany for the period 1990-2013. In the multivariate analysis, we employ Cox 
models to investigate the determinants of the first and the second birth rates. We run separate 
models for younger (aged 17-26) and older (aged 27-47) respondents to explore age-specific 
differences in the effects of economic uncertainty on first birth dynamics. We also investigate 
whether the influence of economic worries varied by level of education and calendar period by 
means of interaction models. These interaction models are, however, restricted to the first birth, 
because our small sample sizes prevented us from conducting similar kinds of interactions for 
higher order births. The final part of the multivariate information explores the effects of the 
partner’s characteristics on first, second, and third birth dynamics. Here we examine whether 
the birth risks were reduced if the partner was very worried about his economic situation. We 
also study interaction effects between the economic concerns expressed by the female 
respondent and her partner, based on the assumption that couples will postpone birth decisions 
if both of the partners have economic worries. 
 
4 Descriptive results 
The GSOEP is a stratified survey, and several subsamples have been added over time. In 
particular, east Germans, migrants, and foreigners are oversampled in the data. In order to 
account for the oversampling of these different subpopulation in the descriptive statistics, we 
display survival curves and hazard rates by population subgroups. Here we distinguish between 
three groups: migrants, west Germans (without the migrant population), and east Germans 
(without the migrant population). The left panels of Figure 1 display the Kaplan-Meier survival 
functions for these three population subgroups. The hazard rates, which are displayed in the 
right panels of the figure, are calculated by dividing the number of events by the person-months 
of exposure for the interval given in the figure. To improve the readability of the figures, the 
hazard rates were multiplied by 1,000. Again, it is important to note that the date of childbirth 
was backdated by nine months. We refer here to childbearing risks, even though pregnancy 
intensities would be more precise. 
The results shown in the figure are in line with previous findings on birth dynamics in Germany. 
The migrants were substantially younger than the non-migrants when they had their first child. 
We also find that the migrants were more likely than the non-migrants to have had a second or 
a third child. The figure further shows that the east Germans were younger than the west 
Germans at the first birth. However, the pattern was reversed for higher order births. While east 
Germans had higher probabilities of transitioning to a first birth, they had much lower 
probabilities than west Germans of progressing to a second- or a third-order birth. The survival 
                                                          
3  In some cases, the month of birth was missing. Here, we imputed this information. Sensitivity analyses 
in which we dropped the imputed cases from the analysis did not provide results which were much 
different from the results presented here. 
curves indicate that only 55 percent of the east Germans had given birth to a second child by 
the time their first child had reached age 10. Among the west Germans, the share was 66 
percent. We also find pronounced east-west differences for third births. When the second child 
was 10 years old, 19 percent of the west Germans, but only 14 percent of the east Germans, had 
given birth to a third child. Among the migrant population, the share was 30 percent. 
Figure 1: Transition patterns to the first, the second, and the third birth, 1990-2013 
First birth (survival function) First birth (hazard rate) 
 
 
Second birth (survival function) Second birth (hazard rate) 
 
 
Third birth (survival function) Third birth (hazard rate) 
 
 
Note: The survival functions and the hazard rates were calculated from left-truncated data that include 
the period 1990-2013. The date of childbirth was backdated by nine month. The monthly hazard rates 
were multiplied by 1,000 and calculated by dividing the number of events and the time of exposure for 
the given categories. Source: GSOEP 1990-2013 
5 Multivariate results  
5.1 First birth 
Table 1 reports the results from the first birth model. The first column displays the relative birth 
risks for the full sample; i.e., the sample which was not yet distinguished by age. We find that 
the birth risks declined over time, which is in line with our assumption that first parenthood is 
postponed in Germany over time. We also find that the east Germans had higher first birth rates 
than the west Germans, which is compatible with the descriptive findings discussed above. The 
migrants had higher birth rates than the non-migrants; a result which was also reported in the 
descriptive statistics. In addition, we find that having a high level of education accelerated the 
transition to the first birth. We assume this was because we control for educational participation 
and university graduates tend to start their family relatively soon after completing their 
education. Compared to those in full-time work, respondents who were participating in 
education have about 50 percent lower first birth risks. Not working or being in part-time 
employment was associated with lower first birth intensities (compared to those in full-time 
work). Unemployment was, however, unrelated to first birth progressions. We also controlled 
for having no partner in the household, which, unsurprisingly, lowered birth intensities 
substantially. The most important finding shown in this table is, however, that the perception 
of economic uncertainty does not appear to be related to fertility postponement.  
We now turn to the question of whether different subpopulations respond differently to 
economic uncertainty. In the literature it has been posited that uncertainty early in the life course 
could be particularly detrimental for birth decisions (Mills and Blossfeld 2003). However, our 
empirical investigations suggest that the opposite is true (for similar evidence, see Kreyenfeld 
and Andersson 2014; Rendall et al. 2009). While economic uncertainty accelerates the 
transition to a first birth at younger ages (17-26), it reduces the transition to a first birth at older 
ages (27-47). How can we explain such a counterintuitive finding? According to the 
psychological literature, young women with limited labor market prospects may “rationally” 
opt for early motherhood as a means of structuring their otherwise uncertain life course 
(Friedman et al. 1994). Yet regardless of how we interpret our results for the younger age group, 
it is important to emphasize that most women in Germany do not seriously consider starting a 
family until after the age of 26. Among the respondents in this age group, economic concerns 
affected their birth decisions. Compared to women who said they were not worried about their 
economic situation, the birth intensities of the women who said they were worried were 22 
percent lower.  
Table 1: Results from the Cox model, relative risks of a first birth (baseline hazard: age of 
woman) 
 
First birth 
Age 17-47 
First birth 
Age 17-26 
First birth 
Age 27-47 
Calendar period        
  1990-2000 1.05  1.18 ** 0.94  
  2001-2006 1  1  1  
  2007-2013 0.78 *** 0.68 *** 0.83 *** 
Region       
 East Germany 1.30 *** 1.40 *** 1.31 *** 
 West Germany 1  1  1  
Migrant       
  Migrant  1  1  1  
  Native 0.61 *** 0.51 *** 0.70 *** 
Education       
  Low 1  1  1  
  Medium 1.02  0.94  1.09  
  High 1.20 * 0.71  1.24 * 
Employment status       
  In education 0.46 *** 0.48 *** 0.54 *** 
  Employed full-time 1  1  1  
  Employed part-time 0.81 ** 1.14  0.80 ** 
  Registered unemployed 1.01  1.12  0.84  
  Not working  0.82 * 0.94  0.75 ** 
Economic worries       
  No worries 1  1  1  
  Some worries 0.98  1.22 ** 0.90 * 
  Big worries 0.99  1.42 *** 0.78 *** 
Partner        
  No partner in household 0.25 *** 0.24 *** 0.26 *** 
  Partner in household 1  1  1  
Note: Flag for missing information included; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.  
Source: GSOEP 1990-2013 
 
 To further explore group-specific differences in behavior, Figure 2 reports results from an 
interaction model. Panel 1 of Figure 2 includes an interaction of the level of education and 
economic worries. The model shows that the gradient for the less and the highly educated 
women runs in opposite directions. While the less educated accelerated their transition to a first 
child when they were subject to economic uncertainty, the highly educated were less prone to 
have a child when they perceived that their economic situation was insecure. It should be noted 
that the gradient for the less educated is statistically significant; i.e., the respondents who were 
very worried behaved very differently from those who were not worried. Among the medium 
educated, the differences between those who were very worried and those who were not worried 
were also statistically significant. However, the interaction was not significant among the highly 
educated; this may be attributable to the small number of highly educated respondents in our 
data (see Table A1 in the appendix).  
We also tested whether the effect of economic uncertainty and fertility had reversed over time 
(Panel 2 of Figure 2). This model specification was motivated by our assumption that the 
association between economic uncertainty and birth dynamics has become stronger over time. 
In particular in the case of Germany, the parental leave benefit reform which was enacted in 
2007 created a new incentive structure for having children. Because the new parental leave 
benefit is tied to income, it incentivizes couples to postpone parenthood until both partners have 
an “acceptable” level of income. As can be seen in the right panel of Figure 2, we indeed find 
a positive gradient for the period after 2007. However, the interaction with calendar time is not 
statistically significant.  
 
  
Figure 2: Results from the Cox model, relative risks of a first birth  
Panel 1: Interaction of economic worries and 
level of education 
Panel 2: Interaction of economic worries 
and calendar period 
  
Further variables in model: Age (baseline), region, migrant status, employment status, flag for 
missing information, calendar period (Panel 1), and education (Panel 2). 
Source: GSOEP 1990-2013 
 
 
5.2 Higher order births 
 
Table 2 reports the results for second and third births. We find very similar patterns for both of 
these birth orders. First, there were no major changes across time. It should be noted here that 
because the observation period is after 1990, we would not expect to see any major changes in 
higher order birth progressions—at least for west Germany, which dominates the overall pattern 
for the country. The east Germans had a lower risk of progressing to a second or a third child. 
This finding was already reported in the descriptive analysis. We also find that the migrants 
transitioned  more rapidly to a second child. However, we do not observe any statistically 
significant differences between the migrants and the natives in the transition to a third birth. 
This finding is at odds with the descriptive statistics, which showed much higher third birth 
rates among the migrants than among the non-migrants. Apparently, some of the covariates in 
our models (in particular, employment status and education) explain some of the differences in 
higher order birth progressions between the natives and the migrants.  
Having a university education was associated with higher second and third birth rates. This 
finding may be related to a “work-accelerated” pattern of childbearing among highly educated 
women. These women tend to space their births closer together, partly to minimize career 
interruptions, and partly because they start childbearing at later ages, and thus need to “squeeze” 
in their children into a shorter period of time before reaching the end of their reproductive period 
(Kreyenfeld 2002). The results for age at first childbirth are as we expected: the higher the age 
at first childbirth, the lower the second and third birth intensities. Living with a partner also 
shows the expected pattern of a strong increase in transition rates to a second and a third birth 
if there is a partner in the household. Women’s full time-employment is shown to be associated 
with lower second and third birth rates. Thus, women’s labor market integration does not seem 
to be a prerequisite for family enlargement in Germany. However, there is some indication that 
the perception of economic uncertainty matters for the progression to a second child. Second 
birth rates declined by 16 percent among the women who are worried about their economic 
situation compared to women who were not worried. For third births, the pattern is similar, but 
statistically insignificant. 
 Table 2: Results from the Cox model, relative risks of a second and a third birth, (baseline 
hazard: time since last birth) 
 Second births Third births 
Calendar period      
  1990-2000 1.01  0.90  
  2001-2006 1  1  
  2007-2013 0.90  1.03  
Region     
 East Germany 0.69 *** 0.77 ** 
 West Germany 1  1  
Migrant     
  Migrant  1  1  
  Native 0.87 * 0.91  
Education     
  Low 1  1  
  Medium 1.19 *** 0.88  
  High 1.83 *** 1.61 *** 
Employment status     
  In education 1.53 *** 1.47  
  Employed full-time 1  1  
  Employed part-time 1.52 *** 1.52 *** 
  Registered unemployed 1.27 * 2.20 *** 
  Not working  1.41 *** 3.06 *** 
Partner      
  No partner in household 0.48 *** 0.64 *** 
  Partner in household 1  1  
Age at first birth     
  Age 15-20 1.20  1.79 *** 
  Age 21-25 1  1  
  Age 25-30 0.83 *** 0.54 *** 
  Age 30-47 0.54 *** 0.25 *** 
Economic worries     
  No worries 1  1  
  Some worries 0.93  0.84  
  Big worries 0.84 ** 0.89  
Note: Flag for missing information included; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.  
Source: SOEP 1990-2013 
 
5.3 Partner’s characteristics 
In a final step, we explore the question of whether the partner’s perceptions of economic 
uncertainty influenced the couple’s birth decisions. Furthermore, we examine the interaction 
effects between the woman’s and her partner’s perceptions of their economic situation. For this 
part of the investigation, we have to restrict the analysis to episodes in which the female 
respondent lived with a (male) partner in the same household. Thus, we are unable to investigate 
the characteristics of the women who lived in more loose relationships, such as living-apart-
together relationships. In addition, women who had children outside of any union are 
disregarded here. These population subgroups may be particularly likely to have feelings of 
economic uncertainty. However, due to the design of the GSOEP, which only surveys the 
characteristics of the co-residential partner, we are unable to include this sub-population in our 
investigation.  
Table 3 reports the results for the effects of the partner’s perception of the couple’s economic 
situation on their birth risks (for the complete results, see Table A2 in the Appendix).  As can 
be seen in the table, the effects of economic uncertainty on the first birth risk were similar for 
the male and the female respondents: while economic uncertainty did not seem to matter at 
younger ages, it led older couples to postpone their childbearing plans. For the second and the 
third birth rates, we also find that economic worries lowered birth intensities. However, here 
the pattern is more irregular and only statistically significant for third births.  
Table 4 reports the finding from the interaction of the female and the male partners’ economic 
worries. The models confirm our assumption that the birth rates would be lower if both partners 
were worried about their economic well-being. Again, this pattern was most pronounced for 
first births at higher ages. Here we find that birth rates drop by 36 percent if the partners said 
they felt economically secure (compared to a couple in which both partners said they were not 
worried about their economic well-being). For higher order births, the coefficients run in the 
expected direction, but are insignificant for second and weakly significant for third births.  
Table 3: Results from the Cox model, transition to a first birth (baseline hazard: age of 
woman), episodes in co-residential partnership, controlled for the partner’s perception of the 
economic situation 
 First birth Second birth Third birth 
 Age 17-26 Age 27-47   
Partner’s economic worries         
  No worries 1  1  1  1  
  Some worries 1.05  0.97  1.05  0.77 ** 
  Big worries 1.08  0.81 * 0.94  0.81  
Further variables in model: Age (baseline hazard in first birth model), duration since last birth 
(baseline hazard in second and third birth model), calendar period, region, migrant status, 
education, employment status, age at first birth (in second and third birth model), flag for 
missing information 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.  
Source: GSOEP 1990-2013 
 
Table 4: Results from the Cox model, transition to a first birth (baseline hazard: age of 
woman), episodes in co-residential partnership, controlled for the couple’s perceptions of their 
economic situation 
 First birth Second birth Third birth 
 Age 17-26 Age 27-47   
Partner’s economic worries         
  Both no worries 1  1  1  1  
  Both some worries 1.14  0.92  0.97  0.71 ** 
  Both big worries 1.11  0.64 ** 0.84  0.74 * 
  Only woman big worries 0.99  0.62 *** 0.85  0.79  
  Only partner big worries 0.83  0.81  0.91  0.77  
  Other 0.82  0.91  0.93  0.77  
Further variables in model: Age (baseline hazard in first birth model), duration since last birth 
(baseline hazard in second and third birth model), calendar period, region, migrant status, 
education, employment status, age at first birth (in second and third birth model), flag for 
missing information 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.  
Source: GSOEP 1990-2013 
  
 6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided recent empirical evidence on the relationship between the subjective 
feeling of economic uncertainty and the transitions to the first, the second, and the third child. 
The analysis was based on rich panel data for Germany for the period 1990-2013. In the 
investigations, we employed event history techniques in which the subjective feeling of 
economic uncertainty—i.e., whether the female respondent or her partner was worried about 
his or her personal economic situation—was inserted into the models as a time-varying 
covariate. 
Previous micro-level studies provided only mixed evidence for the association between 
measures of economic uncertainty and birth dynamics. We argued that inconsistencies in the 
findings of these studies might have stemmed from an inability to explore group-specific 
differences in behavior. Furthermore, we argued that these studies mostly covered the years 
prior to the financial crisis, when factors other than economic uncertainty, and particularly 
ideational changes, might have played a greater role in overall birth dynamics. Economic 
uncertainty may not have emerged as an important determinant of fertility until the new 
millennium. During the “Great Recession,” a large share of the population were affected by 
economic uncertainty, whereas previously only certain segments of the population were prone 
to unemployment and other forms of economic uncertainty.  
Our data for the period 1990 to 2013 provided mixed evidence. We did not find that the 
association between economic uncertainty and birth dynamics had changed significantly since 
the 1990s. We also did not find any clear association between the subjective feeling of economic 
uncertainty and fertility postponement. However, our analysis which took into account group-
specific differences in behavior provided a more nuanced view. First, we found strong 
differences in the uncertainty and fertility nexus by people’s ages. At younger ages (17-26), 
economic uncertainty accelerated first birth transitions. However, for the large majority of 
women and men who had their first child after age 26, economic uncertainty had a very 
powerful and negative impact on family formation. We also found that progression to a second 
birth and third child was negatively affected if the woman and her partner were both concerned 
about their personal economic situation. For higher births, the results were, however, only 
weakly statistically.  
In sum, our results suggest that there are segments of the population for whom a secure 
economic situation is not a prerequisite for forming a family. If this group is not excluded, it is 
difficult to find clear-cut associations between economic uncertainty and birth decisions in 
micro-level studies. The conviction that couples need a secure and stable economic situation 
before having children is apparently not shared by all population subgroups. This belief is most 
prevalent among educated women and those who start their family at later ages.  
Our study has many limitations, of course. Most importantly, Germany was a country that was 
not strongly affected by the global financial crisis. Our result may thus not be transferable to 
other countries who were exposed to more radical economic uncertainties. Furthermore, like 
many of the other researchers who examined this topic while relying on survey data, we 
grappled with small sample sizes. This was particularly the case for higher order births, for 
which we were unable to conduct group-specific analyses. We used the subjective feeling of 
economic uncertainty to operationalize economic uncertainty. Compared to unemployment, this 
measure seems to be better suited to capturing economic uncertainty, particularly because it 
affects a less selective part of the population. Nevertheless, we did not control for unobserved 
population heterogeneity in our models. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that some of 
our “nil-findings” are attributable to the fact that the study population who expressed the 
greatest economic worries differed systematically from the rest of the population in important 
dimensions that we were unable to account for.  
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Table A1: Occurrences (Occ) and time of exposures (Exp), all episodes 
 First birth Second birth Third birth 
 Age 17-26 Age 27-47     
 Exp Occ Exp Occ Exp Occ Exp Occ 
Calendar period         
  1990-2000 39% 432 31% 362 39% 688 39% 244 
  2001-2006 37% 285 37% 400 36% 521 37% 196 
  2007-2013 24% 110 33% 253 25% 298 24% 113 
Region         
 East Germany 74% 583 85% 842 70% 1224 71% 452 
 West Germany 26% 244 15% 173 30% 283 29% 101 
Migrant/ foreigner         
  Migrant  92% 689 91% 912 87% 1217 84% 406 
  Native 8% 138 9% 103 13% 290 16% 147 
Education         
  Low 66% 356 14% 108 17% 315 17% 161 
  Medium 28% 425 60% 613 71% 940 70% 312 
  High 3% 25 23% 271 9% 209 9% 62 
  Missing 3% 21 3% 23 3% 43 4% 18 
Employment status         
  In education 55% 189 4% 31 2% 46 1% 10 
  Employed 27% 414 70% 798 33% 199 30% 58 
  Part-time 4% 64 12% 85 30% 440 33% 134 
  Registered unemployed 5% 83 6% 47 10% 124 9% 59 
  Not working  7% 68 7% 45 21% 587 24% 267 
  Missing 1% 9 1% 9 3% 111 3% 25 
Economic worries         
  Big worries 22% 241 21% 159 26% 344 25% 150 
  Some worries 52% 445 53% 543 55% 838 56% 287 
  No worries 22% 134 26% 310 18% 321 19% 113 
  Missing 4% 7 1% 3 0% 4 0% 3 
Age at first birth         
  Age 15-20     8% 90 10% 86 
  Age 21-25     36% 480 41% 245 
  Age 25-30     33% 569 31% 159 
  Age 30-47     23% 368 18% 63 
Partner          
  No partner in household 80% 313 39% 170 18% 108 13% 47 
  Partner in household 20% 514 61% 845 82% 1399 87% 506 
Total 100% 
           
827  100% 
        
1,01
5  100% 
        
1,50
7  100% 
           
553  
  
Table A1 (continued): Occurrences (Occ) and time of exposures (Exp), co-residential 
episodes 
  First birth Second birth Third birth 
  Age 17-26 Age 27-47       
  Exp Occ Exp Occ Exp Occ Exp Occ 
Partner’s economic worries             
  Big worries 25% 139 19% 109 23% 296 22% 124 
  Some worries 55% 284 54% 460 57% 791 57% 270 
  No worries 20% 88 27% 273 20% 308 20% 109 
  Missing 0% 3 0% 3 0% 4 0% 3 
economic worries             
  Both big worries 10% 66 8% 43 13% 158 12% 69 
  Both some worries 28% 171 30% 265 35% 503 37% 166 
  Both no worries 8% 44 14% 131 11% 164 11% 68 
  Only woman big worries 15% 73 11% 66 10% 138 10% 55 
  Only partner big worries 9% 41 8% 60 10% 132 10% 51 
  Other 30% 119 29% 280 22% 304 21% 97 
Total 100% 514 100% 845 100% 1399 100% 506 
 
  
Table A2: Results from Cox-model, relative risks, transition to first birth (baseline hazard: age 
of woman), second and third birth (baseline hazard: duration since last birth), episodes in co-
residential partnership 
 First birth 
Second 
birth Third birth 
 Age 17-26 Age 27-47   
Calendar period          
  1990-2000 1.19  0.90  1.02  0.91  
  2001-2006 1  1  1  1  
  2007-2013 0.60 ** 0.87  0.93  0.99  
Region (woman)         
 East Germany 1.15  0.93  0.64 *** 0.70 *** 
 West Germany 1  1  1  1  
Migrant (woman)         
  Migrant  1  1  1  1  
  Native 0.50 *** 0.79 * 0.85 ** 0.94  
Education (woman)         
  Low 1  1  1  1  
  Medium 1.20  1.24  1.14 * 0.87  
  High 1.06  1.48 *** 1.78 *** 1.61 *** 
Employment status 
(woman)         
  In education 0.82  0.53 *** 1.58 *** 1.22  
  Employed 1  1  1  1  
  Part-time 0.94  0.68 *** 1.52 *** 1.62 *** 
  Registered unemployed 1.58 ** 0.88  1.20 * 2.31 *** 
  Not working  1.54 * 0.80  1.42 *** 3.20 *** 
Age at first birth (woman)         
  Age 15-20 -  -  1.15  1.73 *** 
  Age 21-25 -  -  1  1  
  Age 25-30 -  -  0.84 *** 0.52 *** 
  Age 30-47 -  -  0.54 *** 0.25 *** 
Economic worries (partner)         
  No worries 1  1  1  1  
  Some worries 1.05  0.97  1.05  0.77 ** 
  Big worries 1.08  0.81 * 0.94  0.81  
Note: Flag for missing information included; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.  
Source: GSOEP 1990-2013 
 
